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Competence and authority: Adolescent Treatment Refusals for Physical and Mental Health 
Conditions  
 
Emma Cave 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper explores the relationship between competence and authority in relation to medical 
treatment refusals. Comparing provisions directed at adults and young people, she explores 
the options before the court if a test case (called for by the British Medical Association and 
the Department of Health) is brought before the court to determine the extent of the minor’s 
autonomy rights to be involved in or make medical treatment decisions at common law. At 
present, the common law rights of competent adults and minors stand in stark contrast. Adults 
can refuse life saving treatment against the advice of doctors, but minors (even if they pass 
the legal test for competence) cannot do so if a parent or the court provides the necessary 
consent in the child’s ‘best interests’. Since the matter was last tested in court, children’s 
rights - including their autonomy rights- have evolved. In light of this, if a minor can 
demonstrate his autonomy in relation to the decision should he, like a competent adult, be 
given the legal authority to decide? Cave asserts that academic arguments against the 
different levels of competence required to consent to and refuse medical treatment should be 
distinguished from arguments about the respective authority a decision to consent and refuse 
may carry. A close examination of the law relating to adults reveals that their decisional 
authority is context-specific. There are circumstances where adults too are powerless to 
refuse medical treatment, regardless of their competence. Statutes enacted post-Human 
Rights Act 1998 which apply to competent minors take a similar approach. Deference to 
children’s autonomy rights does not necessarily require that their competent decisions are 
respected. In particular the paper considers Mental Health legislation, examining its aims and 
how they relate to the restrictions on competent adults and minors and the extent to which 
these provide examples which might be followed when the common law on adolescent 
treatment refusals is tested in court.  
 
Keywords: Competence, children, minors, consent, medical, treatment 
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Introduction 
 
The medical treatment of minors is governed by a variety of laws. In some specialist 
treatment areas statutes and regulations have been enacted: For example, if a minor enters a 
clinical trial, the Medicines for Human Use (Clinical Trials) Regulations 2004 apply; if he 
wants to donate an organ, the Human Tissue Act 2004 applies; if he has a mental health 
problem, the Mental Health Act 1983 might apply. In general, however, the common law 
decision of Gillick [1986] establishes that minors (defined here as those under the age of 16 
unless expressly stated) can consent to treatment if they have the requisite maturity and 
understanding. Lord Scarman said:  
I would hold that as a matter of law the parental right to determine whether 
or not their minor child below the age of 16 will have medical treatment 
terminates if and when the child achieves a sufficient understanding and 
intelligence to enable him or her to understand fully what is proposed [p. 
188H–189A]. 
A competent minor will be encouraged to involve his parents, but the doctor gains the 
requisite authority for treatment from the minor. He need not secure the consent of a parent 
unless the minor fails to satisfy the test and is deemed incompetent to decide.  
 
Lord Scarman refers specifically to consent but it might be assumed that: 
1. A child competent to consent to treatment would also be competent to refuse it. 
2. If competence to consent to treatment gives the minor authority to consent, then 
competence to refuse treatment will give the minor authority to refuse it. 
Both assumptions are called into question following two controversial Court of Appeal 
decisions: Re R [1991] and Re W [1992]. In both cases adolescents were denied the power to 
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refuse1 life-sustaining medical treatment, regardless of their competence. The reasoning 
rested partly on the role of consent in this situation. The legal doctrine of consent serves to 
provide the clinician with a defence to a claim in battery. In turn, the law of battery protects 
patients’ autonomy rights. Consequently, if the act does not constitute a battery (or another 
relevant tort) then the invasion of autonomy is lawful. Lord Donaldson said that consent 
gives doctors a ‘flak jacket’ against a claim in battery. Doctors can get the flak jacket from 
the competent minor, but if the minor is unwilling or unable to provide it, it can come from a 
parent or the court.  
 
Re R and Re W were applied in a number of cases in the 1990s and most recently in Re P 
[2003]. Since that time, children’s rights have evolved to the extent that aspects of Re R and 
Re W are now questionable (Taylor, 2007). The British Medical Association (2009) calls for 
caution in applying the precedents, and the Department of Health (2009) for a test case. In 
light of this, the two assumptions referred to above require fresh examination. There has been 
extensive academic criticism of Re R and Re W (for example Thornton (1992), Freeman 
(1995)). Much of it focuses on the first assumption, though Gilmore and Herring (2011) 
rationalise the asymmetry. They argue that if the competence required to consent is different 
to the competence required to refuse all treatment, then provided the refusal is not competent, 
the law can still be said to uphold minors’ competent decisions. In other words, in rebutting 
the first assumption, the law might avoid rebutting the second. A co-author and I have argued 
elsewhere that their distinction is troubling (Cave and Wallbank, 2012). I shall argue that, if 
the courts decide that paternalistic judgement of welfare should continue to outweigh the 
competent minor’s right to decisional autonomy, it is preferable to rebut the second 
assumption.  
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If a successful challenge of Re R and Re W results in a test which recognises that a minor who 
is competent to consent is also competent to refuse treatment, it does not necessarily follow 
that a competent refusal will carry the same authority as a competent consent. This, I 
demonstrate by drawing comparisons on two levels. First I contrast the law relating to adults 
and minors showing that, in contrast to the liberal common law, there are a number of 
statutory examples where competent adults lack the authority to refuse treatment. Second I 
contrast the common law with relevant statutes on the medical treatment of minors, in order 
to demonstrate Human Rights Act-compliant methods of upholding minors’ autonomy rights 
whilst maintaining the distinction between a competent and an authoritative decision. In 
particular, I examine the 2007 amendments to the Mental Health Act 1983 which insert new 
provisions to reflect the development of children’s autonomy rights but which recognise that 
competent minors lack the authority to refuse treatment which their welfare interests demand. 
Through this examination I gain insight into the potential options before a court, in the event 
that a challenge to Re R and Re W is mounted. 
 
Competence and the right to decide 
 
One of the criticisms levelled at Lord Donaldson’s distinction between consent to and refusal 
of treatment, is that it offends the principle that negative autonomy rights (rights to refuse 
intervention) are stronger than positive autonomy rights. The common law enforces this 
principle in relation to adult treatment where, not only must the doctor secure the consent of a 
competent patient before he treats him, but the patient, if competent, is the only possible 
source of that authority. In Re T (Adult: Refusal of treatment) [1992] Lord Donaldson stated: 
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An adult patient who, like Miss T., suffers from no mental incapacity has an absolute 
right to choose whether to consent to medical treatment, to refuse it or to choose one 
rather than another of the treatments being offered. (at [3])   
 
A link is drawn here between competence, the right to consent and the right to refuse. The 
link remains, even if the decision is, in the views of the clinicians, against the patients best 
interests. Lord Goff in Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] said:  
 
… [the] principles of self-determination requires that respect must be given to the 
wishes of the patient, so that if an adult of sound mind refuses, however unreasonably, 
to consent to treatment or care by which his life would or might be prolonged, the 
doctors responsible for his care must give effect to his wishes, even though they do 
not consider it to be in his best interests to do so. [At 866]. 
If, as Lord Goff states, the right to refuse treatment flows from the ‘principles of self-
determination’, then this as much a right of a competent minor as it is a right of a competent 
adult.  
 
On this basis there is a strong argument for respecting competent refusals. However, by 
exploring the law in more detail, it becomes apparent that the dicta in Re T is context specific. 
The link between respect for self-determination, competence and authority to decide (ie to 
consent or refuse) is not applied universally. This, in turn, has implications for the debate on 
adolescent treatment refusals.  
 
Autonomy and competence 
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Autonomy has been hailed the king of the four principles (Gillon, 2003). In its simplest form 
it involves ‘deliberated self rule’ (Gillon, 1994), but not everyone has the ability to self rule, 
and those who have the ability do not always have the legal right. Beauchamp and Childress 
(2001) have famously argued that respect for autonomy incorporates both the right to make a 
decision and the obligation of others to respect it. For Beauchamp and Childress, what is 
important is the relationship between autonomy and the decision rather than the outcome of 
the decision. Consequently, their conception is as relevant to a decision to consent to 
treatment as it is to a decision to refuse it. Beauchamp and Childress argue that factors such 
as disclosure, understanding and voluntariness combine to make a decision more or less 
competent. The law helps ascertain what is required in a given situation and what authority 
competence confers on the bearer.  
 
However, the law is influenced by factors which go beyond the autonomy of the bearer. 
‘Competence’ and the closely related concept of ‘capacity’ are legal tools reflective of public 
policy. Consequently, some competent decisions are not autonomous. For example, a 
decision might be made on behalf of another, on the basis of incomplete information, or by 
reference to irrational decision making processes. Equally, I will show that some autonomous 
decisions are not competent. Capacity means different things in different situations. Different 
definitions of capacity govern an individual’s authority to enter into a contract (Boughton v 
Knight (1873)), make a will (Banks v Goodfellow (1870)), or enter into marriage (Sheffield 
City Council v E & S [2005]). In some situations capacity is assumed whereas in others it 
must be demonstrated. On the basis of Gillick, the assessment of maturity and understanding 
required shifts according to factors such as the risks involved in the procedure, the influences 
on the minor and the strength and longevity of his view. Contrast this with capacity under the 
Mental Capacity Act 2005, where a presumption of capacity will be rebutted where the 
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individual is ‘unable to make a decision for himself in relation to the matter because of an 
impairment of, or a disturbance in the functioning of, the mind or brain’ (s. 2(1)), and lacks 
the requisite understanding to the extent that the patient is unable to make a decision (s. 3).  
 
Thus, the assumption that a competent decision is necessarily equated to an autonomous 
decision is flawed. In this section I have shown that what the bearer must do to be considered 
competent depends on the situation. Legal competence does not equate to natural or de facto 
competence. In the next sections I will make a linked observation - that the value of 
competence in medical treatment decision-making depends on the situation. 
 
Treatment refusals by adult might be vetoed  
 
If it is accepted that the law determines the relationship between self-determination and 
competence, then Lord Goff’s link between competence, the right to consent and the right to 
refuse is context-specific. Indeed, an examination of relevant statutes reveals that a refusal of 
consent by a competent adult is not always determinative. First, there are cases where an 
adult might be forced to undergo treatment in order to protect others. This might be justified 
on the basis of J.S. Mill’s harm principle that the only legitimate reason to interfere with a 
person’s liberty is to prevent harm to others (Mill, 1959). In Re T [1992], at 653, Lord 
Donaldson postulated that a pregnant woman might fall into this category if a failure to treat 
would harm her viable foetus. Later in Re MB [1997] and St. George’s Healthcare NHS Trust 
v S [1998] it was confirmed that a pregnant woman is in the same position as other competent 
adults. Under the Public Health (Control of Disease) Act 1984, section 37 and 38, an adult 
with a notifiable disease might be forced to undergo hospital treatment if a failure to do so 
would pose a serious risk of infection to other persons. In addition, an adult might be subject 
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to compulsory detention under section 47 of the National Assistance Act 1948 to secure care 
for those who: 
a) are suffering from grave chronic disease, or being aged, infirm or physically 
incapacitated, are living in unsanitary conditions, and  
b) are unable to devote to themselves, and are not receiving from other persons, proper 
care and attention. 
The legislation is little used and much criticised for its abuse of civil liberties and human 
rights (eg Hobson, 1998). What is particularly startling is that, whilst it might be utilised to 
protect the public interest, it might also be invoked to protect the interests of the competent 
person. Similarly, under section 35 of the Public Health (Control of Disease) Act 1984, a 
competent adult might be forced to undergo medical examination if ‘in his own interest, or in 
the interest of his family, or in the public interest, it is expedient that he should be medically 
examined’ (s. 35(1)(b)).  
 
Another situation in which a competent refusal of treatment might be overridden is where the 
adult has a mental disorder. The Mental Health Act 1983 covers the reception, care and 
treatment of people in England and Wales with a mental disorder. As we have seen, the 
Mental Capacity Act 2005 provides a framework for defining when a person lacks capacity to 
make a decision for themselves, and governs how to make decisions on their behalf. Not all 
people with a mental disorder will lack the capacity to make a decision. Part IV of the Mental 
Health Act 19832 permits compulsory ‘medical treatment for mental disorder’ which is 
defined as ‘any disorder or disability of the mind’ (s. 1(2)). Compulsory admission can be 
made for assessment (s. 2), treatment (s. 3) and emergency admission (s. 4). Detention under 
the Mental Health Act might take place even if the patient does not pose a threat to the 
public. Why compulsory admission of patients with mental capacity should be sanctioned 
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because their ill health relates to a disorder of the mind is not entirely clear. It 
paternalistically protects the patient from harm, but so too would a requirement to treat 
physically ill people refusing treatment. (See Bellhouse, 2003, Richardson, 2002, Scott-
Moncrieff, 2004). Section 63 of the Mental Health Act authorises ‘a range of acts ancillary to 
the core treatment’3 and physical and mental health treatments have proved difficult to 
separate. For example, ‘ancillary’ treatment has included force feeding in anorexia nervosa 
cases4 and the induction of pregnancy.5 Ultimately:  
 
The effect of section 63 is to limit the autonomy of the detained patient whose 
capacity is unimpaired to treatments that are not related to the mental illness of 
disorder for which he is detained.6 
 
It is clear then, that Lord Goff’s assertion that the principles of self-determination override 
the state’s duty to act in what doctors determine to be in his best interests is context specific. 
The right of competent adults to refuse medical treatment which exists at common law is not 
mirrored in the statutes examined in this section. As we shall see, for minors too, Parliament 
has decreed that competence does not necessarily give the authority to consent; and even if it 
does, it is not necessarily the only source of authority.  
 
Treatment refusals by minors may be vetoed 
 
We have seen that there is considerable variation in the rights which flow from a finding in 
law that an adult’s medical treatment decision is competent. The same applies to children, but 
in their case, their special legal status is a relevant consideration. There are numerous 
restrictions on their rights and responsibilities which are lifted when they achieve adult status. 
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The law balances minors’ autonomy interests with their basic interests (for example, their 
interest in health) and their developmental interests (Eekelaar, 1986). Autonomy interests 
themselves take different forms. Coggan (2007) distinguishes between three types of 
autonomy. Ideal desire autonomy (an objective view of what is best) sometimes overrides 
actual desire autonomy (based on current desires) and even best desire autonomy (reflecting 
the person’s long term values). Compliance with the European Convention on Human Rights 
helps regulate the extent to which autonomy interests must be balanced with the rights of 
others and with conflicting individual rights. This balance takes into consideration the facts 
that children are potentially vulnerable and that their decision is often shared by and will 
usually impact upon their family (Ribot, 2012). Consequently if an adult and minor are both 
legally competent to make a similar medical treatment decision, there may be valid reasons 
for allowing the adult to decide but denying this right to the minor. For both adults and 
minors, the test and the relevance of a finding of competence is context specific. For minors, 
however, the context is affected by virtue of their status as children. 
 
For adults and minors alike, the legal consequences which flow from a recognition that a 
decision is competent vary from one situation to the next. Different legislative frameworks 
emphasise different principles. For example, the Children Act 1989 emphasises the child’s 
welfare; the Mental Health Act 1983 (as amended in 2007) balances the patient’s best 
interests and public protection (Laing, 2000). From the minor’s perspective, the different 
principles inherent in the various applicable laws make for an inconsistent set of rights. 
Depending on their age and vulnerability, minors might be affected by laws designed to 
protect adult rights; children’s interests; parental rights; or vulnerabilities by virtue of a 
mental disorder or impairment. Likewise, there might be divergences between the rights of 
competent adults and competent children in relation to medical treatment. Arguably the rights 
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which flow from competence protect different values in each case. For adults, there is greater 
emphasis on autonomy. For minors the right to autonomy competes with other rights, 
including the paternalistic protection of their health. In some situations their (perceived) 
vulnerability has led to restrictions not only on the rights of competent minors to refuse life-
sustaining treatment, but also their ability to consent. I have argued elsewhere that the 
Medicines for Human Use (Clinical Trials) Regulations 2004 are overly restrictive of 
competent minors’ rights to consent or assent (Cave, 2010). A minor under 16 years cannot 
provide the necessary consent to take part in a clinical trial. Schedule 1, Part 4, Paragraph 13 
provides that; ‘Informed consent given by a person with parental responsibility or a legal 
representative to a minor taking part in a clinical trial shall represent the minor’s presumed 
will.’ The risks inherent in research might be thought to justify this paternalistic approach, 
but it is not one which is enforced in all cases where a child is given risky treatment. For 
example, the same experimental treatment which a child would have no power to consent to 
or refuse might be given to him ‘off label’ (unlicensed) in which case his authorisation might 
be accepted even in the face of parental opposition (Gillick, 2009). Not only are children 
unable to provide the legal authorisation required to participate in a clinical trial, but they are 
not necessarily required to assent to it (though their assent, particularly if competent, is 
encouraged).7  
 
The Clinical Trials Regulations were enacted post Human Rights Act 1998 as were 
amendments to the Mental Health Act 1983. The 2007 amendments give additional 
protection to competent minors’ autonomy rights but interestingly the Act still recognises that 
the competent minor is not the only potential source of the authority to treat. The Act does 
not demand that competent refusals are respected, but it limits the list of those who can veto a 
competent refusal.  
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Minors and the Mental Health Act 1983 (as amended) 
 
Under the Mental Health Act, formal, compulsory treatment is the option of last resort 
(DH/NHMHE (2009) para 3.8). In relation to both young persons (aged 16-18) and children 
(under 16), the Code points out that recent changes in human rights jurisprudence demand 
greater deference to minors’ autonomy rights (Department of Health, 2008: para 36.33 and 
36.43). Accordingly, the Code states that where a competent minor refuses treatment, : ‘… it 
may be unwise to rely on the consent of a person with parental responsibility’ (MHACP, para 
36.43). If the minor does not meet the criteria for formal admission under the MHA, the 
assistance of the High Court might be sought. Naturally, this covers those situations where 
the child is not Gillick competent and the person with parental responsibility cannot be found, 
or is not acting in the child’s best interests,  but it also includes situations where the child:  
 
 …. Is Gillick competent or is a young person who is capable of making a decision on 
their treatment and is refusing treatment. (MHACP, para 36.66.) 
 
The emphasis of the provisions for treating minors with a mental disorder is less on ensuring 
that their decision is autonomous and more on ensuring that minors are compliant, and that 
they get the treatment which doctors consider to be in their best interests. The aim seems to 
be to reduce the incidences, as far as possible, of coercive treatment and to limit unnecessary 
restrictions on liberty. Formal detention might be utilised on the basis that the minor is 
refusing treatment rather than because the minor lacks the competence to refuse the treatment. 
Similarly, a minor who has fluctuating competence but who is expected to refuse consent 
when they regain competence might be detained under the Mental Health Act rather than 
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awaiting a return of competence before a decision is made (DH/NIMHE, p. 38). In relation to 
minors aged 16 and 17, the Guide for Professionals recommends that the Mental Capacity 
Act is not relied upon where: 
There is some other specific identifiable risk that the young person might not receive 
the treatment they need … and that either the young person or others might potentially 
suffer harm as a result. (DH/NIMHE, p. 39). 
 
Relevant Codes require that a minor whose consent is relied upon is not subject to any undue 
influence (DH/NIMHE, 2.6), but the implication is that it is undue influences which result in 
a decision which does not reflect the best interests of the minor and society which will not be 
tolerated. Under this legislation a distinction emerges between different levels of compulsion. 
In seeking authorisation for treatment, practitioners might promise a minor: ‘consent or we 
will seek court authorisation and force you to undergo treatment.’ The minor might later 
thank the doctor in the manner of Odysseus who ordered his crew to tie him to the mast so 
that he might resist the sirens. A minor whose disease prevents her from recognising the fact 
that her objection is a short lived product of her illness is not making an autonomous 
decision, whether she consents or refuses. Nevertheless her consent is likely to be respected 
and her refusal overridden. 
 
The 2007 amendments respond to developments in the jurisprudence of children’s rights, 
including their autonomy rights. I have shown that the amendments leave considerable scope 
for manipulating or overriding the competent decisions of minors to refuse treatment. In the 
next section I consider the implications for adolescent treatment refusals at common law. 
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Gillick 
 
If we accept that competence confers different rights and authority on the bearer depending 
on the purpose of the particular law, then this begs the question: what was the purpose of 
Gillick? Unfortunately, the Law Lords did not make clear whether they intended competence 
to confer merely a right to consent, or a broader right to decide between relevant options 
(potentially including the refusal of life-sustaining treatment). Gillick competence gives 
minors decisional authority to agree to treatment which doctors believe to be in their best 
interests, but the question remains: does it also enable minors to make decisions which are 
contrary to their medical interests? The test for competence is decision-specific and thus the 
threshold of understanding and maturity is commensurate with the gravity of the decision. 
Recall the first assumption. If this is rebutted, a minor who is competent to consent may be 
held to lack competence to refuse treatment upon which her life depends. On this method, the 
link between competence and authority is retained - the second assumption is preserved. 
Paternalistic protection of the minor is achieved by raising the threshold for competence, 
perhaps even making it impossible to achieve. The problem with this interpretation is that it 
subjectivises the Gillick competence test and makes it outcome- rather than decision-specific. 
This distances the concept from a reflection of the minor’s capacity for self-determination. 
 
Alternatively, it is arguable that, when the case was heard, the intention was not to transfer to 
minors the authority to decide between treatment and no treatment, but instead to confer a 
much more limited right. Arguably this right merely enabled minors to provide the authority 
for a course of action which coincides with their best interests. Harris has scathingly referred 
to this as a ‘a right to acquiesce in a decision which has already been taken’ (Harris, 2003). 
Even on this conception, the power was of some value, for by enabling competent minors to 
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provide the authority for treatment, parental consent is not necessarily required. Competent 
minors gain a right to confidentiality.  
 
Maclean (2008) has argued that Gillick merely confers a right to make decisions in the child’s 
best interests, and that, on this basis, a distinction can be drawn between powers to consent 
and to veto treatment. If this is so then Gillick  is just one of a number of examples where 
competence confers only limited authority on the bearer – in this case, a right to make a 
decision which coincides with their best interests.  
 
Rights 
 
Would this position be compatible with human rights arguments? Let us return to Lord Goff’s 
assertion that the right to refuse treatment is part of the right to self-determination. Article 
8(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights 1950 (the Articles of which are 
incorporated into UK law in the Human Rights Act 1998) protects the right to a private and 
family life. In the European Court of Human Rights decision, YF v Turkey (2004), it was 
stated that ‘a compulsory medical intervention [without consent], even if it is of minor 
importance, constitutes an interference with this [Article 8] right’. However, Article 8(2) 
limits the Article 8(1) right. It does not require that detention of a competent patient is limited 
to those cases where public health demands it. It sanctions interference with Article 8 ‘for the 
protection of health or morals’. Article 8 does not preclude there being more than one 
authority for consent, even if the patient is competent, as it recognises that paternalism (be it 
on grounds of poor physical health, poor mental health, risk of disease, or youth) is a relevant 
consideration. Likewise, Article 5(1)(e) of the Convention allows deprivation of liberty ‘for 
the prevention of the spreading of infectious diseases, of persons of unsound mind, alcoholics 
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or drug addicts or vagrants’, but requires that the detention must be necessary and 
proportionate.  
 
Eekelaar (1994) has put forward a related argument in relation to balancing Articles 3 and 12 
of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989. This Convention is not 
legally binding in the UK but establishes recognised standards. Article 3 recognises the 
importance of the best interests of the child,8 whilst Article 12 asserts that: 
 
State Parties shall assure to the child who is capable of forming his or her own views 
the right to express those views freely in all manners affecting the child, the views of 
the child being given due weight in accordance with the age and maturity of the child. 
Article 12 does not confer a right to decide, but merely a right to participate in the decision in 
a manner commensurate with his capacity. In 2009 the Committee on the Rights of the Child 
issued a General Comment on the Right of the Child to Be Heard (2009) emphasising that 
Article 12 ‘… applies to individual health-care decisions …’. Eekelaar argues that tension 
between Articles 3 and 12 is resolved through ‘dynamic self-determinism’ whereby the 
minor’s best interests are determined by reference to the values and beliefs of the minor, 
provided those beliefs coincide with an objective view of the minor’s interests. The minor’s 
views have increasing relevance as they mature and the longevity of their opinion is 
established. If the view is competent it might be determinative.  
 
Limited rights to refuse life-sustaining treatment are unlikely to conflict with the European 
Convention on Human Rights of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. 
Nonetheless, some countries take a different approach, enabling competent minors to make 
an authoritative refusal of treatment, and linking competence and authority in a wider range 
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of situations (eg Ribot, 2012). Though there has yet to be a test case, Scotland probably 
supports such a right (Elliston, 2007)).  
 
Conclusion 
 
I have not entered into the debate as to whether the law ought to safeguard the best interests 
of minors by protecting them from their own competent medical treatment decisions. Indeed I 
have made brief reference to the questionable morality of laws limiting the rights of 
competent adults and minors to make decisions which do not comply with a paternalistic 
judgement of welfare. One option before the court in a test case would be to declare that 
competent minors have the same rights to consent to and refuse medical treatment as adults. 
At the opposite end of the spectrum, another option would be to confirm Re R and Re W so 
that parents and the court retain the ability to override minors’ competent treatment refusals 
out of respect for their ‘best interests’. Alternatively, the court might seek to improve the 
protection of minors’ autonomy rights whilst retaining the option of restricting minors whose 
decisions are contrary to their best interests. This might be achieved by rebutting one of two 
assumptions which might be thought to flow from Gillick: 
1. A child competent to consent to treatment would also be competent to refuse it. 
2. If competence to consent to treatment gives the minor authority to consent, then 
competence to refuse treatment will give the minor authority to refuse it. 
I have suggested ways in which a test case might rebut the second assumption and how this 
might be justified on the basis of precedent and human rights. In addition, I have put forward 
an argument that this would be a preferable route to protecting minors’ interests to rebutting 
the first assumption by accepting that the threshold for competence to consent is lower than 
the threshold for competence to refuse medical. Though rebuttal of the first assumption 
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would enable the court (if it so wished) to uphold the second assumption, the victory for 
minors’ autonomy rights would be hollow, as doctors and courts would be able to raise the 
competence threshold to very high or impossible levels whenever the outcome of the minor’s 
decision is contrary to (what they perceive to be) his best interests.  
 
I have argued that the distinction between competence and authority is a feature of a number 
of laws relating to medical treatment decisions of both adults and minors and that this 
position does not necessarily conflict with the Human Rights Act 1998. Children’s autonomy 
rights have evolved since Re R and Re W (Perera, 2008). In Axon [2006] Justice Silber argued 
that parental rights under Article 8(1) dwindle until the child is competent to make his own 
decisions, at which point they disappear altogether (Cave, 2009). The result is that, in a test 
case, the court might choose to follow the example of the Mental Health Act 2007 and 
enhance protection of minors’ rights by limiting the rights of parents to consent when their 
child refuses, but retain the jurisdiction of the court to override a competent decision. In 
theory this would apply to decisions to consent as well as to refuse. Consider, for example, a 
minor who is offered an abortion which a parent challenges in court on the basis that it is 
contrary to the minor’s best interests. In practice, however, it is more likely to be exercised in 
relation to refusals of treatment, as doctors rarely offer treatment to a minor which might be 
perceived as contrary to his best interests. 
 
We have seen that under the Mental Health Act, compulsion is a last resort, but the scheme 
does not eschew a softer form of paternalism whereby the minor might be persuaded to agree 
to treatment rather than face possible court authorisation or compulsory treatment under the 
Mental Health Act. Similar reasoning might be applied to minors who initially refuse to 
comply with the recommendations of clinicians in relation to treatment for physical health 
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problems. The fact that the court can overrule a competent decision to refuse life saving 
treatment might be utilised by clinicians to persuade the minor to accept treatment. Nor is this 
form of paternalism universally reviled. Thaler and Sunstein (2008) argue that investment 
goods (where the cost is borne immediately but the benefit enjoyed later) are ‘prime 
candidates for nudges’. They show that no choice is neutral and that a nudge in the right 
direction is an acceptable form of paternalism.  
 
The law might utilise the concept of competence to control who may claim it; the 
circumstances in which it might be claimed; and its bearing on who has the authority to make 
the relevant decision. If the court retains the jurisdiction to override a competent treatment 
decision by a minor, then competence does not give him a right to self-determination, but a 
more limited right to have his opinion considered when the court determines what is in his 
best interests (Cave, 2011). The greater the minor’s competence, the stronger his ‘voice’ will 
be.   
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